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CASE NOTES
proceeding, and the FTC must wait for a consummated acquisition before it
can issue a cease and desist order.
This decision, therefore, has created a serious void which should quickly
be filled. Some agency must have the responsibility and the power to prevent
mergers which will violate the antitrust laws if consummated, especially in
view of the economic damage and the often near impossibility of unscrambling
companies which have been merged for a subgtantial period of time. It would
appear that an amendment to the ACPA which would allow the Justice De-
partment to investigate proposed mergers may be necessary in order to
counteract the decision in the instant case."
It thus appears that the court in this case, by going beyond the issues
before it, has done a disservice to the cause of antitrust law enforcement.
Despite the court's apprehension, there is no reason to believe that the
Justice Department would exercise its power improperly (notwithstanding
its attempt in this case) because there are already sufficient safeguards built
into the AGFA. A more strict interpretation of "person under investigation"
would have solved this case equitably. The fact that every disputed demand
will be examined by a courtn should be a sufficient safeguard so that a court
need only pass upon the legality and sufficiency of the demand itself, rather
than undertake to narrow or construe the act beyond what is required by the
facts before it. A later decision by another court of appeals to remedy the
situation and set the ACPA back on an even keel would be most welcome.
LAWRENCE A. MAXHAM
Constitutional Law—Twenty-first Amendment—Price Regulation-
Extra-territorial Effects.—Joseph E. Seagram el Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter.'
—The New York Legislature has amended the state Alcoholic Beverage Con-
trol Laws2
 to insure that the wholesale liquor prices in New York are no
higher than the lowest wholesale prices charged by brand owners anywhere
else in the country. To this end, section 9 of the new law requires that a
30
 A less effective but nevertheless valuable alternative would be for the FTC to
make greater use of its rule-making power, 38 Stat. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (1964),
to promulgate rules for the guidance of corporations and corporate 'counsel in evaluating
proposed acquisitions or mergers. Although not a method of enforcement, such rules would
provide a reliable guide and would be uniform—both distinct improvements over the
present situation. In Permanente Cement Co., Trade Reg. Rep. Tr. Binder, 1963-1965
F.T.C. Complaints, Orders, Stipulations 11 16885 (1964), the FTC indicated it intended
to hold public hearings and formulate rules for guidance purposes as authorized by its
Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. § 1.63 (Supp. 1964). However, since a set of such rules
must be confined to a single industry, it will be a long time before a significant portion
of American industry will have the use of them. See Elman, Rulemaking Procedures in
the FTC's Enforcement of the Merger Laws, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 385 (1964); Note, 40
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 771, 782 (1965).
31 The demand may be enforced in court by the Government, under 76 Stat. 551
(1962), 15 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1964); or it may be questioned in court by the demandee,
under 76 Stat. 551 (1962), 15 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1964).
1
 16 N.Y.2d 47, 209 N.E.2d 701, 262 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1965).
2
 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 531.
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brand owner, when filing the monthly schedule of prices, file an affirmation
that the prices to wholesalers in New York are "no higher than the lowest
price at which such item of liquor" was sold during the previous month to
any wholesaler or state agency operating a public liquor enterprise in the
country. The foundations for this legislation were the findings and con-
clusions of a study conducted by the Moreland Commission,' namely, that
there is very little correlation between prices and consumption and that
the New York consumer was therefore being discriminated against by about
$150 million each year because of the high level of resale price maintenance
encouraged by the then existing ABC Law. 5 Seagrams and others° instituted
this action for declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds, inter alia,
that the statute was a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment7 and the commerce clauses of the United States Constitution.
The New York Court of Appeals° HELD (4-3): The statute is valid under
the broad powers given the states by the twenty-first amendment to the
United States Constitution and is not an unreasonable interference with
interstate commerce. 1° The dissent would strike down the statute as an
unjustified exercise of police power since it is not aimed at satisfying any
health, safety, or welfare need.
Once again the issue arises as to the scope of the power to control
liquor given to the states by the twenty-first amendment. Section 1 of the
amendment provides for repeal of the eighteenth amendment,'' and section
2 provides that "the transportation or importation into any State, Territory,
or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." Section 2,
despite the clarity of the language used therein, is subject to conflicting in-
terpretations. On the one hand is the interpretation that the section gives
the states the power to regulate the liquor industry within its borders only
insofar as the regulations tend to promote temperance or to control some
evil inherent in the commodity. This interpretation would have section 2
do no more than raise to constitutional dignity the statutory rights that the
states had before the amendment was passed.'? On the other hand is the
3 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 531, § 9.
4 The Moreland Commission was appointed by executive order on February 15,
1963, to study the liquor industry and the New York Alcoholic Beverage Law.
5 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1950, ch. 689, rule 31.
6 There are a total of 62 plaintiffs in this suit—distillers and wholesalers of
alcoholic beverages.
7 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, el. 3.
9 Affirming 45 Misc. 2d 956, 258 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 23 App. Div. 2d
933, 259 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1965).
10 The Court ruled on other matters; the scope of this note is limited to considera-
tion of the price regulation provision as regards powers of the states relative to the
twenty-first amendment.
11 U.S. Const. amend. XVIII.
12 The Wilson Act subjected liquor imported into one state from another to the
laws of the state even though the imported liquor was still in the "original package." 26
Stat. 313 (1890), 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1964). The Webb-Kenyon Act prohibited the impor-
tation of liquor into a state in violation of the laws of that state. 37 Stat. 699 .(1913),
27 U.S.C. § 122 (1964).
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interpretation that section 2 gives a state the power to prohibit liquor within
its borders, and, therefore, a state can regulate the industry in any degree
short of prohibition. The liquor industry, having a considerable interest in
maintaining its heretofore favored position in New York, finds itself in the
paradoxical position of arguing that the former interpretation is correct
and that, since a low price does not tend to protect the public from the
evils inherent in the commodity which it manufactures and merchandizes, the
state cannot insist that the wholesaler, and ultimately the consumer, be
charged a low price.
However, the thrust of the arguments on both sides of this case, em-
phasizing the right of a state or the lack thereof to insist upon low prices,
is perhaps misguided. Given the conclusions of the Moreland Commission
and other supporting studies,i 3 the real issue may well be a state's right to
regulate liquor prices at all, high or low, within the bounds of a normal
price range. The Moreland Commission's studies indicate that there is very
little, if any, correlation between price and consumption." This result is
explained by two factors: (1) The demand for liquor in general is not
very price-sensitive, within the normal price range, and (2) while the prices
of individual brands may be changed, the range -of prices remains relatively
fixed and some brands of liquor are priced at each level within the range,
with the result that an individual consumes' a relatively fixed quantity of
"cheap" or "good" liquor, depending upon where the individual brand prices
lay within the industry price range. Thus, the quantity demands for in-
dividual brands may change as prices change, but the demand facing the in-
dustry will remain about the same. Add to this conclusion the facts that there
is a vast difference between consumption and intemperance and that the in-
temperate drinker is not apt to be deterred to any significant extent by the
minor variations in price, the result is that price control affords little, if any,
protection against intemperance. Therefore, given these facts, the issue be-
comes one of a state's right to control prices at all; and if a state does have
this right, it has the right to set prices much as it sees fit.
The early cases construing the twenty-first amendment contain lan-
guage in support of the contention that it gives to the states plenary power
over the liquor industry within its borders sufficiently broad to include
power to enforce regulations not aimed at temperance. The later cases, upon
which the liquor industry relies as restricting the scope of state power, can
justifiably be read in such a way as either to sustain the early cases or to
deal with entirely different issues.
In State Bd. v. Young's Mkt.," the first case construing the twenty-
first amendment, a state tax on the importation of beer from another state
was challenged. Recognizing that prior to the twenty-first amendment the
tax would have been invalid as a burden upon interstate commerce, the
Court held that the amendment abrogated the right to tax-free importation
111
 Dunsford, State Monopoly and Price-Fixing in Retail Liquor Distribution, 1962
Wis. L. Rev. 454.
14
 Moreland Commission Reports on the New York Alcoholic Beverage Control
Law, Rep. No. 3, at 19.
15
 299 U.S. 59 (1936),
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from one state into another and that it did not demand that a state impose
the same restrictions on a domestic seller as on an importer: "To say that
would involve not a construction of the Amendment, but a rewriting of it.”1 °
The Court refused to say that under the twenty-first amendment a state is
freed from all police power restrictions regarding liquor traffic, because under
the facts of the case the Court was not required to go that far. However,
there is nothing to indicate that the statute was aimed at, or that the Court
viewed it as aimed at, any evil inherent in alcohol or at temperance promo-
tion.
The case of Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp. 17 followed, which con-
cerned a state statute prohibiting the importation into the state of certain
liquors unless the brand was registered with the United States Patent Office.
Triner claimed that the statute violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, whereas the Liquor Control Commissioner contended
that the statute was a reasonable regulation and that, in light of the twenty-
first amendment, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
did not apply to liquor importation. The Court held that it was not con-
strained to determine the reasonableness of the regulation since the Com-
missioner's second contention was valid. The Court said that, under the
twenty-first amendment, discrimination was permissible even if not incident
to a reasonable regulation, and that the twenty-first amendment is not to
be construed to forbid the violation of only reasonable laws. Again, the
Court showed no concern as to whether the regulation was aimed at any
evil inherent in the trade.
There followed other cases in the same vein. A retaliatory statute,
which prohibited the importation of beer from any state that discriminated
against beer produced in the enacting state, was Upheld. 18 The Court refused
to consider whether the statute might have been more properly protective
of the domestic producers rather than regulative of the evils of alcohol, "for
whatever its character, the law is valid."° Shortly thereafter, a state statute
was challenged insofar as it precluded any but common carriers from trans-
porting liquor out of the state of manufacture. 2° The Court there said that
the twenty-first amendment abrogates the commerce clause regarding liquor;
that a state may regulate liquor and may adopt measures reasonably ap-
propriate to effectuate its laws; and that a state could exercise full police
power over liquor. While noting that the regulation at issue was part of a
comprehensive statute designed to protect citizens from the inherent evils
of alcohol and to facilitate the collection of revenue, the Court in no way
implied this to be a condition precedent to valid liquor control. Rather, it
stated that since a state can prohibit alcohol, it can prescribe the conditions
under which alcohol can be sold or do anything else short of prohibition.
And in 1958, the Court denied California leave to file a bill of complaint
18 Id. at 62.
17 304 U.S. 401 (1938).
18 Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391 (1939). See
Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939).
19 Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, supra note 18, at 394.
20 Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939).
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contesting the constitutionality of a Washington statute concerning the
importation of alcoholic beverages. 2 ' California claimed the statute was dis-
criminatory; but the Court, denying the petition in a per curiam opinion,
merely cited the above line of cases in support of its decision.
In 1964 two cases were decided, upon which the industry relies as
indicating a trend toward limiting state powers over liquor; but this reliance
appears misplaced. In one case 22 the Court refused to uphold the validity of
a state tax on liquor imported into the state from Scotland and still in the
"original package." It reasoned that the twenty-first amendment did not
repeal the import-export clause 23
 and that the express power over the taxa-
tion of imports given thereby was retained by the federal government. How-
ever, although there is by this case at least one area of regulation—taxing
international imports—that is closed to a state, the result is not inconsistent
with the prior decisions as regards the commerce clause and the fourteenth
amendment. The Court relied heavily upon the fact that the federal govern-
ment is vested with control over taxation of imports by an express provision
of the Constitution. In the other case,24 a more troublesome one, the Court
refused to permit a state to deny a dealer the right to sell liquor in a state-
owned airport, where the customer received only a stub upon payment and
received the merchandise upon arrival in a foreign country. 25 Over a vigorous
dissent, the Court treated the transaction as part of the passage of alcohol
through the state; and while reaffirming that the power of a state in restrict-
ing entry for use, distribution, or consumption within its borders is un-
confined by the commerce clause, the Court said that the federal govern-
ment retained some power under the clause and that a state could not prevent
shipment through the state 28
 In so holding, the Court noted that the state
was,
 not seeking to prevent an unlawful diversion of the liquor into state
commerce, which is permissible apart from the twenty-first amendment. 27
One could justifiably quarrel with the interpretation of the facts of this case
in that there was "delivery" to the retailer in New York and the words of
the twenty-first amendment are "delivery or use" (emphasis added); but
21 California v. Washington, 358 U.S. 64 (1958), rehearing denied, 358 U.S. 923
(1958).
22 Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341 (1964).
23 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 2: "No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress,
lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing its inspection laws. . . ."
24 Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
25
 The State Liquor Commission attempted to enjoin the operation for failure of
the company to conform to certain aspects of its ABC Law pertaining to the physical
facilities required of dealers.
26
 This view is consistent with the line of cases holding that a state cannot prevent.
liquor from being transported through a state since "transportation through" is not
"use or distribution" in the state. See Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S_
518 (1938).
27 The Court has sustained the right of a state to enact statutes regulating the pass-
age of liquor through the state as long as such statutes are reasonable in preventing the
liquor from being diverted into the commercial stream of the state. See Carter v.
Virginia, 321 U.S. 131 (1944) ; Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390 (1941). The statutes
involved in these cases were upheld without recourse to the twenty-first amendment.
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given this interpretation of the facts, the result and the wording of the
Court are perfectly consistent with, and not limitations upon, the earlier
cases. No "warning" can reasonably be gleaned from these cases that the
scope of the twenty-first amendment is being restricted, as the industry
contends."
Other cases upon which the industry relies are not persuasive in indi-
cating a narrowing of the scope of the twenty-first amendment. They merely
state that Congress still has power to control interstate activity in liquor
where a state is not attempting to control the use or distribution of liquor
within the state; that a state law is effective only within its jurisdiction; and
that congressional activity is valid where it is not being used to destroy
the policy of a state in the exercise of its power to control liquor within the
state.29
It would appear, therefore, that the New York statute is well within
the grant of the twenty-first amendment insofar as its regulatory effect of
keeping prices at a relatively low level is concerned; for the consistent
interpretation of the amendment is such as to give a state broad plenary
powers, not limited to regulations aimed at promoting temperance. Mr.
Justice Black, dissenting in Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.,8°
indicated that the history of the twenty-first amendment bears this inter-
pretation out and that the Court had theretofore regarded the language of
the amendment so clear that it had refused to consider the history. He
further stated that the granting of concurrent power, originally section 3
of the proposed amendment, 81 was intentionally stricken because it would
have defeated the purpose of restoring to the states the control of their
liquor problems. As Senator 'Blaine said, section. 2 restores to the states
"absolute control of liquor entering into the state." 82 In the light of the
history, wording, and interpretation of the twenty-first amendment, it seems
to insure a state's right to regulate price, whether high or Iow; and, there-
fore, the statute here involved is valid in terms of its objective of a low price.
Quite apart from the validity of the statute in terms of its objective is
the validity of the means by which this objective is to be achieved; for
whether a state is acting pursuant to its police power or its power under the
twenty-first amendment, it cannot extend its power into another jurisdiction.
The statute requires the filing of the affirmation of the "no higher than the
lowest elsewhere" level of prices. The question is whether, as the industry
28 Brief for Appellants, p. 25, supra note 1.
28 United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324, U.S. 293 (1945); William
Jameson & Co. v. Morganthau, 307 U.S. 171 (1939). The Frankfort case involved a
conspiracy among manufacturers and dealers to fix prices, and the Court upheld a
conviction for violation of the Sherman Act. In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter emphasized the fact that Colorado had remained silent as to liquor pricing
and that for this reason only did the commerce clause apply. He noted, however, that
under the twenty-first amendment a state may erect any barrier it pleases.
30 Supra note 24, at 334.
31 See 76 Cong. Rec. 4138 (1933) (Senate debates on the proposed amendment to
the Constitution).
82 76 Cong. Rec. 4143 (1933).
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claims,83
 this provision produces such an effect on the operations in other
states as to be invalid as an attempt to extend the enacting state's juris-
diction into another state. The argument is made that, in light of the size
of the New York market, a brand owner will have to consider the reper-
cussive effects of any other market price change upon the New York market
and that the effects on the New York market may be such as to preclude
him, as a practical matter, from lowering his price elsewhere. However, if
this were to occur, the effect on interstate commerce and the out-of-state
operations would certainly be indirect and self-imposed. The New York
statute would in no way be controlling out-of-state activity except insofar
as an owner allowed himself to be influenced and guided in his pricing policies
in other markets. But undeniably, the statute itself is, in terms of its direct
effect, one of purely internal state regulation.
Regarding this point, the Supreme Court has upheld state taxes which
condition the amount of tax due upon happenings outside the state. A state
Chain store tax was upheld, the tax being dependent upon the total number
of stores that the taxpayer operated, including stores outside the boundaries
of the taxing state." Further,
there is a residuum of power in the state to-make laws governing
matters of local concern which nevertheless in some measure affect
interstate commerce or even, to some extent, regulate it. . . . When
the regulation of matters of local concern is local in character and
effect, and its impact on the national commerce does not seriously
interfere with its operation, . . . such regulation has generally been
held to be within state authority."
The Court has also said: "The mere fact that state action may have reper-
cussions beyond state lines is of no judicial significance so long as the action
is not within that domain which the Constitution forbids."88 And in Baldwin
v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.," it affirmed that a state may use its police power
where necessary to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens
even though interstate commerce be incidentally affected.
In regard to the extra-territorial effect, it is worthwhile to consider
some other aspects of the New York statute. Given the power of a state
to regulate prices and to tie a regulation to an event or condition outside
the state, the New York Legislature could have selected a particular date and
then required the brand owner to affirm that, thereafter, the New York
wholesale price is no higher than the lowest' wholesale price elsewhere on
the selected date 88
 What the legislature did, as opposed to what it could
as Brief for Appellants, pp. 16-20, supra note 1; Reply Brief for Appellants, p. 25,
supra note 1.
.
84
 Great Atl. & Pac. Tea. Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937).
83
 Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761,, 767 (1945).
30 Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53, 62 (1940).
37 294 U.S. 511 (1935),
88
 This necessarily follows because, by selecting a price as of a date in the' past,
New York could not be charged with interfering with activities in another state, for
the current price in another state would be unrelated to the current price in New York.
This would be no different from selecting as a price standard the Cost of Living Index,
as was suggested in the majority opinion.
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have done, in effect reposed in the brand owner a greater amount of flexi-
bility. Further, were New York a "state liquor monopoly" state, having a
state agency as wholesaler and buyer from the brand owner, the agency
could by force of its economic power or by statute require the same affirma-
tion that the present statute requires, as is done in Pennsylvania. 30 Thus, to
declare the statute invalid for reason of the method selected to achieve the
desired results would be to penalize the state for granting to the industry
more rights and flexibility than it had to give or to penalize the state for
not operating its own liquor monopoly. This would put a premium on form
and cleverness rather than on substance and straightforwardness.
The Supreme Court has noted jurisdiction. 40 The liquor industry, if it
is to prevail, is faced with a formidable task. The industry must convince
the Court that the objectives of the statute are not protected by the twenty-
first amendment and are an unwarranted exercise of police power 4 ' or that the
method chosen to achieve the objectives is invalid because of the extra-
territorial effects that result from the operation of the statute. It is submitted
that the statute's objectives are well within the powers granted the states by
the twenty-first amendment; that the statute is a valid exercise of police
power; and that the indirect extraterritorial effects of the statute are not
such as to render the statute unconstitutional.
WILLIAM A. LONG
Insurance—Direct Action Statutes—Shipowner's Limitation of Liability.
—In the Matter of Independent Towing Co. 1 —The claimants brought an
action in the federal district court in Louisiana against the owners of the
tug Itco III for damages suffered in a maritime accident in Louisiana waters.
The tug owners, in turn, filed for a limitation proceeding.° An injunction
was issued prohibiting all suits against the vessel and owners until de-
termination of the limitation proceeding. The claimants then instituted
actions against the vessel's insurer pursuant to Louisiana's direct action
statute.3
 The insurers, claiming that no direct action could be brought against
them until final determination of the limitation proceeding, sought a stay.
They maintained that they could not be found liable until the shipowner's
liability had been established, and then only up to the amount that the
32 Supra note 1, at 57, 209 N.E.2d at 704, 262 N.Y,S.2d at 80.
40
 34 U.S.L. Week 3182 (U.S. Nov. 23, 1965) (No. 545).
41
 The argument can be persuasively made that the statute is a valid exercise of
police power, apart from the twenty-first amendment, under the decision in Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), in that a state can protect its citizens from discrimina-
tory pricing. The regulation is valid unless arbitrary, discriminatory, or irrelevant to a
policy the legislature is free to adopt. In the present case, the state has enacted a statute
aimed at protecting its citizens; the statute can be shown to be neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory; and it is sufficiently flexible to allow the industry to adjust prices to a
profitable level.
242 F. Supp. 950 (ED. La. 1965).
2
 Rev. Stat. § 4283 (1875), 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1964).
a La. Rev. Stat. § 22:655 (Supp. 1964).
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